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Introduction

Implications
• Know your enemy (the disease and pathogen) through
supporting innovative research. Government and the
industry should invest strongly and continuously in
research related to African swine fever. Important research areas include African swine fever virus (ASFV)
biology, ASFV-host interaction, point-of-contact
diagnostics, safe and efficacious vaccines, swine farm
biosafety and biosecurity risk management systems,
and high containment facilities that are suitable for African swine fever research.
• Science and technology alone are not enough without
purpose and direction. All stakeholders of the swine industry should develop and enact science-based policies
on foreign animal disease outbreak emergency management.
• To eradicate swine fevers, leaders of the swine industry and governments should work together. Governments should ensure their goals and policies are fully
supported by swine farm owners, farm employees, pork
processing plants, animal health companies, veterinarians, regulatory agencies, social media, and the public.
• The transboundary nature of emerging and reemerging high consequence animal infectious disease
threats requires global cooperation. This international
cooperation should be not only in outbreak management, but also in research for a broader biomedical,
social, and ecological understanding of disease systems.
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John Steinbeck drew the title of his novel “Of Mice and
Men” from a line in a Robert Burns poem “To a mouse”: “The
best-laid plans of mice and men/Go often awry.” Unlike John
Steinbeck who used the title to mirror the characters who were
struggling during the Great Depression to the mouse whose
nest was accidentally destroyed by the poet (Burns 1785), we
chose this line to emphasize that the best-laid plan can go
wrong in infectious disease control and prevention. Here, we
will discuss the contributing factors behind the global successes
and failures in the prevention and control of swine fevers—
classical swine fever (CSF) and African swine fever (ASF).

Swine Fevers (Classical Swine Fever and African
Swine Fever) are not Swine Flu
Swine fevers and swine flu are different diseases caused by
completely different viruses. However, swine fevers and swine
flu are often regarded as the same disease by the public. This
is in part due to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic where the
human influenza virus contained genetic segments from the
swine influenza virus (Neumann et al., 2009). Swine flu and
human flu are caused by negative-strand RNA viruses (influenza A virus). In contrast, CSF and African swine fever
are caused by a small positive-strand RNA virus (CSF virus,
CSFV) and a large double-strand DNA virus (ASF virus,
ASFV), respectively. To date, no evidence suggests that ASFV
and CSFV can infect humans, even though they often cause
lethal infection in pigs of all ages. Various inactivated swine
flu vaccines with different levels of efficacy are used on swine
farms all over the world. On the other hand, safe and efficacious modified live virus (MLV) vaccines (such as the C-strain
vaccine) have contributed to the successful control of CSF in
many countries (Luo et al., 2014; Blome et al., 2017). But there
is no safe and efficacious vaccine for ASF.

Vaccines and Diagnostics: Technological Tools
for Infectious Disease Control and Prevention
Vaccines are the most cost-effective tools for animal infectious disease control and prevention in disease-endemic regions.
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Based on the nature and/or production method of antigens,
vaccines can be classified into five different categories: 1) tissuederived vaccines (inactivated or live) with little or no antigen
purification; 2) inactivated vaccines in which pathogens are
inactivated by the chemical methods after they are processed
from cell culture or fermentation systems; 3) MLV vaccines
with naturally or genetically modified attenuated live microbes;
4) subunit vaccines in which the antigens are purified from native pathogen cultures or recombinant expression systems; and
5) nucleotide (DNA and RNA) vaccines in which partial genetic
segments from the pathogens are used to directly induce antigen
expression in the immunized animal or incorporated into microbial vectors for antigen expression and delivery.
The selection of a certain type of vaccine for field use
in animal disease control and prevention should be based
on its safety and efficacy profile and cost-effective analysis,
not how the vaccine is produced. The first three categories
(tissue-derived, inactivated, and MLV) of vaccines have
been used in the field since the late 1800s and the last two
categories of vaccines (subunit and nucleotide) were developed with new technologies in the last few decades (McVey
and Shi, 2010). For many infectious diseases, one or more of
the five types of vaccines have been developed with robust
and efficient manufacturing processes. Therefore, safe and
efficacious vaccines are affordable and available for use in
various animal populations.
In addition to vaccines, diagnostics are also essential
tools for animal disease control and prevention. For antigen/
pathogen detection, antigen capture antibody enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA), real-time quantitative polymerase chain reaction (PCR), lateral flow assay (LFA), and
a fluorescent antibody test (FAT) are routinely used in a laboratory setting. Various forms (indirect, Sandwich, and competitive) of ELISA have been developed to detect antigen/
pathogen-specific antibodies in animals after vaccination or
infection. Virus serum neutralization assays (and surrogate assays like hemagglutination inhibition) are still very useful for
characterizing antibody responses.
Diagnostics that can differentiate infected from vaccinated
animals (DIVA) are crucial tools for animal disease control
and eradication. DIVA assays are extremely useful for the control of a newly emerging infectious disease or a foreign animal
disease as they can enable the “vaccinate-to-live” strategy by
which vaccinated animals can be raised and processed for
food production and consumption and/or international trade.
Genetic DIVA assays are designed to identify the genetic difference between a vaccine antigen and a virulent field pathogen.
Serological DIVA assays target the difference in host immune
response to the vaccine strain (after vaccination) and virulent
field strain (after infection).

Classical Swine Fever/Hog Cholera
What is classical swine fever?
Pigs with CSF, also known as hog cholera, have clinical signs
such as high fever, loss of appetite, lethargy, and high mortality

rate. CSF/hog cholera was first reported in the Ohio river valley
in the 1830s, and it still causes significant economic losses to the
swine industry in Asia and presents a significant agricultural
security threat to CSF-free countries such as the United States.
CSF is probably one of the earliest swine viral diseases identified by animal disease researchers in the early 20th century.
It was the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
scientists Emil Alexander de Schweinitz and Marion Dorset
who first demonstrated in 1903 that the highly contagious hog
cholera was caused by a virus (not a bacterium) and hogs that
survived from the infection were immune from future infection
(Lofflin, 2009).

CSF control and its impact on animal health regulation in the United States
Hog cholera/CSF caused devastating losses to American
swine producers since the late 1800s. According to USDA’s historical data, “Outbreaks in 1886, 1887, and 1896 each killed
more than 13% of the Nation’s hogs; more than 10% died
during the 1913 outbreak. The disease was still costing producers $50 million a year in the early 1960’s” (USDA 2019).
Around the beginning of the 20th century, smoke rising aloft
from the burning of dead pigs on farms across the prairies
of the Midwest was the heart-breaking evidence of CSF destruction. It is not an overstatement that CSF was the most
destructive disease of swine in the United States for more than
a century (1830 to 1970).
Although the eradication of CSF from the United States in
1978 was a great success story, one must remember that many
important pieces of research were carried out before the 17-yr
effort (1961 to 1978), with the support from the pork industry
as well as State and Federal governments. After the initial federal ban (1963) on interstate shipment of virulent CSF virus
or of feeder pigs and breeding stock vaccinated with CSF vaccines, use of MLV vaccines and inactivated vaccines continued
until banned in 1969 (Lofflin, 2009; USDA, 2019). Most of
the control policies were developed based on the early CSF research findings of USDA scientists and veterinarians. Injection
of hyperimmune anti-CSF serum plus CSF virus was used as
a routine CSF control method for decades until CSF vaccines
with reasonable efficacy were developed in the 1950s. Large
scale field trials involving thousands of swine farms were conducted to evaluate the field efficacy of anti-CSF biologics (vaccines and antiserum products). The plans and policies for CSF
eradication in the United States were developed based on the
knowledge regarding how the CSFV was transmitted. Other
significant contributions included clinical trials with anti-hog
cholera serum products, various inactivated CSF vaccines and
MLV vaccines, and the development of fast and accurate diagnostic methods for CSF.
Actions and governmental regulations associated with CSF
control in the United States played an important role in the
development of animal health policies in general. Since the
discovery that pigs injected with hyperimmune serum could
be protected from CSF virus challenge in 1907 (USDA, 2019),
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anti-hog cholera serum production and processing plants mushroomed in Kansas City and the rest of the Midwest (Lofflin,
2009). Interestingly, pigs were not only an important food
source for ordinary Americans 100 yr ago, they were also very
important to the politicians. Then-President Woodrow Wilson
attended National Swine Show (Figure 1A), and his Secretary
of the U.S. Food Administration Herbert Hoover believed
that food would help the U.S. win World War I and started
a national campaign for greater swine production (Nebraska,
2020). He said in 1917: “We need a ‘keep-a-pig’ movement in
this country, and a properly cared for pig is no more unsanitary
than a dog. Every pound of fat is as sure of service as every
bullet, and every hog is of greater value to the winning of this
war than a shell.”
Given the social and economic importance of pork production in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century,
perhaps it was not a surprise that one of the earliest anti-hog
cholera serum plants in the Kansas City area was created by
Mason Peters, a lawyer and former U.S. congressman in Kansas
(Kansas, 1914). He saw the potential of this biological product
(Figure 1B). Mason Peters “was one of the most active in the
original research work for the practical use of this remedy to
combat hog cholera.” Equally amazing is that an academic institution like Kansas State Agricultural College also owned and
operated an anti-hog cholera serum plant from 1908 to 1948
(Dykstra, 1952). The transgenerational significance of that
serum plant location is obvious as the “Serum Plant Road”
on Kansas State University campus today leads to USDA’s
National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF) in which research related to CSF will continue (Montgomery, 2019).
Furthermore, the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act, which enacted
federal regulation of veterinary biologics in 1913, was passed
largely because of public concerns over the safety and efficacy of
veterinary vaccines from Europe and hog cholera products being
produced and marketed across the country (USDA, 2020). The
new law required the USDA to ensure that veterinary biologics
(vaccines, bacterins, antiserums, and similar products) sold in the
United States are pure, safe, potent, and efficacious.
The successful eradication of CSF in the United States
was the result of a determined and comprehensive approach
including 1) more than 60 yr of scientific research and development on CSF virus and the disease management tools (antiserum products, vaccines, and diagnostics); 2) science-based
regulatory decisions from all levels of government; and 3) the
public and private partnership of all stakeholders related to the
swine industry. We can summarize the best-laid plan in CSF
prevention and control (the U.S. story) as:
1. Know your enemy (the disease and pathogen) through supporting innovative research.
2. Develop and implement science-based governmental policies at both state and federal levels.
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Figure 1. Pigs were important animals to the President and other politicians
100 yr ago. Shown are two advertisements in The Poland China Journal
(January 10, 1917) that depicted the relationship between pigs and politicians
in the early 20th century. (A) President Woodrow Wilson at the National
Swine Show in 1916. (B) Former U.S. Congressman Mason S. Peters and
his six sons formed the National Serum Company with seven serum plants
around Kansas City.
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3. Ensure the cooperation of all stakeholders of the pork industry including pig producers, animal health companies,
veterinarians, and regulatory agencies.

Why CSF is still endemic in Asia and how can it be
eradicated in the future?
It has been clearly demonstrated that CSF can be eradicated
with less ideal tools (vaccines and diagnostics) in a country with
large and intensive swine production systems. Nevertheless,
CSF remains one of the most devastating diseases of swine
in many other large pork-producing countries such as China,
Vietnam, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
This phenomenon is intriguing as these countries have produced or have had access to the C-strain CSF vaccines that are
affordable, available, safe, and efficacious against all known
genotypes of the CSF virus.
With the development of better vaccines and faster and
more accurate diagnostic assays over the last 20 yr, CSF endemic countries have more and superior technological tools
for CSF control and eradication than the United States did
in 1960 to 1978. Subunit vaccines based on CSFV structural
protein E2 have been marketed since the 1990s and newer versions of E2 subunit vaccines have also been now manufactured
and marketed by different companies in Asia (Blome, et al.,
2017; Gong, et al., 2019). One of the distinct advantages of E2
subunit vaccines is their intrinsic capability of differentiating
vaccinated from infected animals in which infected pigs would
produce antibodies against other CSFV structural proteins
such as Erns (Madera et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2020).
The C-strain MLV vaccine is an attenuated live virus and
can provide complete protection against wild-type CSFV
with the onset of effective immunity just 5 d after vaccination
(Graham et al., 2012). The only drawback of this vaccine is
that it is difficult to differentiate pigs vaccinated with C-strain
from pigs infected with field strains of CSFV. This shortcoming
may be overcome soon because a C-strain CSFV Erns-specific
monoclonal antibody (mAb) has been recently generated by
our group (Wang et al., 2020). A cELISA is being developed
to differentiate pigs vaccinated with the C-strain vaccine from
pigs infected with wild-type CSFV or unvaccinated pigs, based
on the observation that the latter two groups of pigs do not
produce antibodies that can compete with this C-strain Ernsspecific mAb. This is an example of a positive DIVA marker.
With the help and guidance from the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the World Animal Health Organization
(OIE), many if not all CSF endemic countries in Asia have
developed national policies for CSF control and eradication
(China, 2012; FAO and OIE, 2014). Thus, it is not the lack of
technological tools and/or government policies that have hindered the eradication of CSF in these CSF endemic countries.
Because the C-strain vaccine can be cost-effectively produced
and marketed or freely distributed to swine producers in China
and other Asian countries, lack of resources (vaccines) does
not seem to be the major constraint to control CSF, which is

often the case in tackling a major disease epidemic such as the
COVID-19 (McMahon et al., 2020).
There is no doubt that CSF outbreaks can be effectively
controlled by routine and high coverage vaccination with the
C-strain vaccine, but the success of this approach requires government support in providing sufficient and qualified field veterinarians and establishing an effective disease diagnostic and
epidemic information network. More importantly, the government at all levels (central and local) should provide sufficient technical support and financial compensation to swine
producers whose pigs might have to be culled due to localized
CSF outbreaks. Furthermore, government, industry associations, and the media can also play an important role in raising
public awareness that CSF can and should be eradicated soon.
Without an effective eradication plan, CSF will continue to
negatively affect general consumers due to pork price increase
and overall inflation when pork production is disrupted by disease outbreaks.
Thus, the eventual eradication of CSF from CSF endemic
countries may depend on whether and when all stakeholders
of the pork industry can form a real partnership and work cooperatively for the same goal. To make this partnership effective,
pork producers and animal health companies also must equally
contribute to control and eradication efforts. These efforts will
include strict compliance with government regulations on vaccination and animal movement; eliminate production, marketing,
and use of CSF vaccines when a vaccination ban is placed in
effect in the final stages of a CSF eradication plan.

African Swine Fever
What is African swine fever?
Although CSF and ASF share similar clinical signs such as
high fever, loss of appetite, lethargy, and high mortality rate,
these two diseases are caused by two distinct and unrelated
viruses. The CSFV is a small (12.3 kb) RNA virus with only
four structural proteins, while the ASFV is a large DNA virus
(170 to 190 kb genome) with more than 50 structural proteins
(Schulz et al., 2017). Since ASF was first reported in Kenya,
ASF research has been the focus for only a few laboratories in
Europe after its first emergence in the 1960s. This might be partially due to the observation that ASF was eradicated in most
parts of Europe in the 1990s. The re-emergence of ASF in east
European counties since 2007 sparked more interest in ASF research (Borca et al., 2016), the urgency for and the intensity of
ASF research are increased significantly worldwide only after
the ASF outbreak was first reported in China in 2018 (Zhou
et al., 2018). Since then, ASF outbreaks have occurred in many
other pork producing countries in Asia including Vietnam,
South Korea, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Indonesia
(Figure 2). More recently, ASFV has been detected in wild
boars in Belgium and Germany (USDA, 2020). Because there
are significant knowledge gaps about ASFV and ASFV–host
interactions, it is no surprise that safe and efficacious commercial ASF vaccines have yet to be developed.
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Figure 2. Global distribution of ASF, 2005–2020. This map is based on data from the OIE World Animal Health Information system (https://www.oie.int/
wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Disease information/Diseaseoutbreakmaps?) and Global Disease Monitoring Reports (https://www. swinehealth.org/global-diseasesurveillance-reports/). The names of countries with ASF are given on the map. Countries with continuing ASF outbreaks were labeled with the year when the
first outbreak was reported since 2005. Data not shown: the following countries reported new ASF outbreaks in 2019: Sierra Leone, Chad, Belgium, Hungary;
and in 2020: Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine,
Romania, Moldova, Russia, China, Mongolia, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Philippines, South Korea, and North Korea.

Was an ASF outbreak in China/Asia inevitable?
Three conditions might explain why ASF research in
China was not a priority before 2018: 1) limited preparations
for ASF research—there were very limited high containment
(biosafety level 3) research facilities in China that were available for animal studies on foreign animal diseases such as
ASF; 2) false security—CSF and foot and mouth disease
(FMD), two other highly contagious and devastating swine
viral diseases are largely controlled in China via mass vaccination; and 3) false optimism—because ASF has been largely
eradicated in Europe in the 1990s, it was not hard to imagine
that ASF could be controlled quickly by culling pigs infected
with ASF virus. Consequently, research on ASF as a foreign
animal disease was not carried out as a priority in China
to develop the tools essential for the prevention and control
of ASF.
Before the rapid spread of ASF in China that was first reported in August 2018, policymakers in China were aware of the
serious threat of ASF and had implemented an ASF-specific
national policy—“Technical Specification for Prevention and
Treatment of African Swine Fever” in 2015 (China, 2015).
Based on online public reports (https://finance.huanqiu.com/
article/9CaKrnJY1uN and http://www.cpwnews.com/content-23-9199-1.html), the General Administration of Customs
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of China (GACC) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) organized several ASF-specific emergency response drills in northern provinces and cities including Inner Mongolia, Hebei,
Beijing, and Tianjin in 2016 and 2017. The risk of importing
transboundary animal diseases associated with the “One Belt
One Road” Initiative (BRI) was highlighted as the rationale
behind these exercises.
Although no direct evidence that ASFVs were introduced
to China via commercial activities of the BRI, there are two
intriguing relevant observations: 1) the first ASF outbreak was
likely started in mid-June (was confirmed on August 2, 2018) on
a swine farm in the outskirts of Shenyang (Zhou et al., 2018),
the provincial capital of Liaoning Province; and 2) on June 11,
2018, the first convoy of six trucks and two buses supplying
with fruits and vegetables returned from a 25-d round trip from
Dalian, China to Novosibirsk, Russia. Shenyang is 400 km
from Dalian and a likely stop on the road from Novosibirsk
to Dalian (https://www.sohu.com/a/238415268_267831?_
f=index_pagerecom_417). However, what happened next
was puzzling: the second ASF case was confirmed 12 d later
in Zhengzhou (http://www.xinhuanet.com /fortune/201808/16/c_1123281884.htm), which is 1300 km south of Shenyang.
It is even more troubling and puzzling that tens of millions
of pigs were lost due to ASF outbreaks all over China and some
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of its neighboring countries in less than 1 yr. These losses probably eclipsed the total number of pigs lost on the entire planet
to ASF over the previous 90 yr. ASF meetings in China were
often packed with hundreds of swine producers with the hope
to find a miracle weapon to control or prevent ASF on their
farms (Figure 3). Without the help of a safe and efficacious
commercial ASF vaccine, swine producers in China and the rest
of Asia have quickly recognized the importance of biosafety
and biosecurity in swine production over the last 2 yr.

How to develop a successful plan for ASF prevention and control?
After ASF outbreaks started in China, swine producers
quickly learned that, unlike CSF or FMD that could be effectively controlled by mass vaccination, there is no commercial ASF
vaccine in the world. Without a tool to implement a “vaccinateto-live” policy, millions of pigs were culled in the early days of
ASF outbreaks in China. Although this control measure seems
to be in line with OIE and FAO guidelines, the losses and disruption it created soon became unbearable for at least two reasons:
1) the social and economic impact associated with the huge increase of pork price in a few months after the number of pigs
available for the market was reduced quickly and dramatically,
and 2) the environmental risk associated with disposing of thousands of pigs on farms in a short period of time.
Without an available safe and efficacious vaccine, swine
producers quickly realized that they have to significantly improve biosafety and biosecurity measures on farms to prevent
the introduction of ASFV, and use “targeted culling—pull
the bad tooth” to remove ASFV infected pigs from the facility

Figure 3. ASF meetings for swine producers were held frequently in China
during the first half of 2019. Shown here was an ASF meeting at Nanning,
China on March 20, 2019. While 500 people pre-registered, 800 swine farmers
and animal health professionals showed up at this “Protect Pigs from ASF
and Survive” meeting. The focus of this meeting was on-farm practices that
can minimize the biosafety and biosecurity risks associated with swine production. Photo courtesy of Mr. Yuanfei Gao of Yangxiang Group, the organizer of this ASF meeting.

to avoid further disease spreading and to preserve the herd.
“Reopening” some of the infected farms for production became possible after carrying out intensive disinfection of the
infected facility. In addition, significant changes have to be
made in biosafety practices to minimize the risks associated
with many factors associated with swine production. These
risk factors include culled pigs, lagoons, pigs and feed purchased from outside suppliers, selling pigs to others (trucks
and personnel from outside vendors), drinking water, boots
and coveralls, insects, rodents and pests on farms, swine
semen, and use of veterinary pharmaceuticals and vaccines.
Implementing policies to incentivize employees to follow
biosafety rules and remodeling the current facility for better
biosafety control are also common practices for many swine
operations. However, many of these changes are very costly
and can only be effectively managed by well-funded large operations. Nevertheless, various “Reopening” or “Re-grow”
plans have been developed and tested to raise pigs before a
highly efficacious vaccine is available.
If a successful plan for ASF prevention and control could
be developed, it should resemble the plan that facilitated the
U.S. eradication of CSF more than 40 yr ago. Briefly:
1. Know your enemy (the disease and pathogen) through supporting innovative research.
Invest strongly and continuously in research related to
ASFV, ASFV–host interaction, point-of-contact diagnostics, safe and efficacious vaccines, swine farm biosafety and
biosecurity risk management systems, and high containment
facilities that are suitable for ASF research.
2. Develop and implement science-based governmental policies at both state and federal levels.
Develop and implement science-based animal disease outbreak emergency management policies that will encourage
the full participation and support of pork producers and
consumers: swine farmers, pork processing plants, and the
public. These policies must consider: 1) what will happen if
the government does not compensate swine producers for
their loss due to ASF outbreaks? 2) how can swine farmers
properly cull/dispose of thousands of pigs in a short period
of time?, and 3) how do the processing plants/slaughterhouses deal with ASFV positive products?
3. Ensure the cooperation of all stakeholders including pig
producers, animal health companies, veterinarians, regulatory agencies, social media, and the public.
Because the public is a significant stakeholder of the pork
industry, it is not enough to tell the public that ASFV does
not infect people. Instead, the swine industry should educate
the public that ASF outbreaks affect the livelihood of many
parts of the society including swine producers, workers on the
farm, grain and feed producers, pork processing plants, grocery stores, truck drivers, animal health companies, restaurants, international and regional pork/grain/feed importers and
exporters, and all consumers of pork products. Animal health
companies should only manufacture and sell safe and efficacious ASF vaccines, and swine producers should only use au-
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thorized ASF vaccines. Veterinarians should employ only field
tested, effective immunization, and biocontrol practices. Ad
ditionally, ASFV positive products should not be produced,
transported, sold, or consumed by anyone. Swine production
security is a “weakest-link in the chain” problem. Therefore,
the only way to achieve long-lasting security of the system is to
improve the strength of the weakest link through full cooperation and regulatory compliance among all stakeholders.

Future Prospective
CSF and ASF are swine viral diseases with high consequential social and economic impacts in endemic countries.
Successful prevention and control of ASF and CSF requires
not only safe and efficacious vaccines and fast and accurate
diagnostic tools but also science-based government policies
that ensure the cooperation of all stakeholders of the swine industry. Science and technology alone are not enough without
the effective partnership of the public.
Despite recent devastating outbreaks of ASF and CSF in
Asia, the countries of North America and Europe demonstrated decades ago that ASF and CSF can be eradicated with
proper government policy and adequate scientific and technological tools. The world has indeed changed since then, notably
with ever-increasing high-density swine production and globalization, which demands more innovative approaches to solve
new problems:
1. What is the best way to cull/dispose of thousands of pigs in
a short period of time in a restricted area to take into consideration of animal welfare, economic and environmental
impact, and technical feasibility?
2. Because large quantities of various disinfectants are used to
inactivate the ASFV on swine farms, the negative impacts of
these biosafety measures on environment, food safety, and
human health should be carefully investigated.
3. The transboundary nature of emerging and re-emerging
high consequence animal infectious disease threats requires
global cooperation not only in outbreak management, but
also in research for a broader biomedical, social, and ecological understanding of disease systems.
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